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Theories of reference in the 20th Century have been almost exclusively theories of
singular reference i.e. theories of the use of proper names and denite descriptions
to refer to single objects. This is in marked contrast with medieval theories and the
traditional theories of reference that are part of syllogistic logic. Even at the turn
of the century, the theory propounded by Bertrand Russell in his 1903 Principles
of Mathematics where quantier phrases (built up out of determiners such as all,
every, any, a, someand theapplied to a common count noun) were said to
stand for denoting concepts was a theory of general as well as of singular reference.
But then Russell abandoned this theory in his 1905 paper, On Denoting, where
all quantier phrases, and not just denite descriptions, were said to be incomplete
symbols, and all propositions that he had earlier described as containing denoting
concepts were now said to be eliminable in favor of conjunctions and disjunctions of
singular propositions.1
Proper names, in Russells rst theory, were said not to have any meaning (such
as might be expressed by a denite description) but to merely indicate without
meaning([PoM], p. 502) a view not unlike that propounded nowadays by the so-
called new theory of direct reference. In his later theory, however, Russell took
ordinary proper names to be eliminable in terms of denite descriptions though he
did allow for a category of logically proper names(such as thisand that), each
of which he said applies directly to just one object, and does not in any way describe
the object to which it applies.2 This category of logically proper names gured
prominently in Russells logical atomism, where the idea of eliminating all forms of
general reference found its clearest paradigm. Indeed, this way of reducing general
reference to the singular reference of logically proper names, or what came to be
called individual constants, was laid out explicitly by Carnap in his state description
semantics, which he applied to quantied modal logic as well.3 In many ways, and
however unwittingly, it is this paradigm for reducing general reference to singular
reference that has sustained the so-called newtheory of direct reference.
1Thus, Russell claimed that his new theory gives a reduction of all propositions in which denoting
phrases [sic] occur to forms in which no such phrases occur(p. 45 of [L&K]).
2See On the Nature of Acquaintance(1914) in [L&K], p. 167f.
3See Carnap [1946], where, in terms of his state description semantics, Carnap validated the
necessity of identity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism, and what later came to be called the
Barcan formula, for which he gave an informal semantical argument as well.
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Aside from this paradigm, there were no explicit arguments against theories of
general reference in favor of singular reference. This situation changed in 1962 when
Peter Geach published his book, Reference and Generality, which was later revised
and reprinted in 1980. In this book, Geach developed arguments that are supposed
to apply to any theory of general reference, as well as others that are designed to
work specically against Russells early theory and medieval suppositio theories. The
arguments that are supposed to apply to all theories provide a useful foil against
which to test a proposed theory of general reference, which is how we view them here
in what follows. In terms of the framework of conceptual realism4, we shall describe,
a theory of reference that represents general and singular reference in a uniform way,
and we shall then test the adequacy of this theory by seeing how Geachs arguments
fail to apply to it.
It should be noted that the theory of reference we will sketch is a conceptual
theory, by which we mean a theory that attempts to explain the use of referential
concepts in speech and mental acts, which is what some philosophers of language call
a pragmatic theory, as opposed, e.g., to a purely abstract semantical theory. It is our
view that this is where reference has it basic and primary role, and that any other
notion of reference will be derivative upon this. A fundamental goal of this sort of
theory is that it should generate logical forms that represent the cognitive structure
of our speech and mental acts, as well as logical forms that represent only the truth
conditions of those acts, and it must then show how these two kinds of logical forms
are connected. The distinction is important in that logical forms that represent the
truth conditions of our speech and mental acts need not also represent the cognitive
structure of those acts, including in particular the referential and predicable concepts
that underlie them and in terms of which their cognitive structure is characterized.
1. The Core of Conceptual Intensional realism
There are really two kinds of realism in conceptual realism: an intensional realism
having to do with the denotata of nominalized predicates and propositional forms,
and a natural realism having to do with natural kinds and natural properties and
relations. We will concern ourselves here only with the former and not at all with
the latter.5
The core of the theory, which we will only briey describe here, amounts to an
extension of standard second-order logic in which sentence forms and predicate ex-
pressions can be nominalized and allowed to occur as abstract singular terms on a
par with individual variables with the one modication that the rst-order part of
the logic is free of existential presuppositions for singular terms. Complex predicates
4See Cocchiarella [1989] and [1996] for more details about this framework.
5See Cocchiarella [1996] for a description of how both kinds of realism are contained in the general
framework of conceptual realism.
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are formed by means of -abstraction, so that where ' is a formula and y1; :::; yn are
pairwise distinct individual variables, [y1:::yn'] is an n-place predicate expression.
A predicate expression is always accompanied by a pair of parentheses (and commas
if it is relational) when it occurs in its functional role as a predicate, as in F (x1; :::; xn)
and [y1:::yn'](x1; :::; xn), where F and [y1:::yn'] are n-place predicate expressions.
(We drop the parentheses and commas when referring to predicates simpliciter.) To
nominalize a predicate expression, we simply drop the parentheses (and commas) and
allow the result to occur as an abstract singular term as in G(F ), G([y1:::yn']),
R(x; F ), and even G(G) and R(x;R), where G is a 1-place, R a 2-place, and F and
[y1:::yn'] are n-place predicates (for n 2 !). (This applies whether G and R are
predicate variables, constants, or -abstracts, as, e.g., in [x']([x'])). (We use
capital letters for predicate variables and constants, lower-case letters for individual
variables, and Greek letters for formulas.)
Because predicates can be nominalized, the comprehension principle of our core
theory, which we call HST, can be stated in the following simple form (where F is
not free in '),
(9F )([x1:::xn'] = F ); (CP)
from which the more usual (but weaker) form,
(9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ ']; (CP)
follows. Russells paradox, as represented through the Russell predicate [x(9G)(x =
G ^ :G(x))], is not derivable in HST, which in fact is consistent (relative to weak
Zermelo set theory) and equipollent to the theory of simple types6. This is because
even though the Russell predicate, by (CP), stands for a concept, i.e., even though
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F )
and therefore
(9F )(8x)(F (x)$ (9G)[x = G ^ :G(x)])
are provable in HST, nevertheless all that follows by Russells argument is that when
nominalized, the abstract singular term corresponding to the Russell predicate fails
to denote an object (as a value of the bound individual variables), i.e.,
:(9y)([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = y)
is also provable.7
6See Cocchiarella [1986] for the proofs of these claims.
7Denotation is not the same as reference in this framework, where the latter, as we explain in a
subsequent section, is a pragmatic concept having to do with the exercise of referential concepts (as
cognitive capacities). Denotation, on the other hand, is a semantic concept involved in the evalution
of truth conditions. To say that a singular term a fails to denote, we mean that :(9y)(a = y) is
true, where y is an individual variable not occurring free in a.
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It is important to distinguish predicable concepts here, which are values of the
predicate variables, from the abstract objects (if any) that are their intensional con-
tents and that are denoted by nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms.
We take predicable concepts to be intersubjectively realizable (and in that sense ob-
jective) cognitive capacities, or cognitive structures based upon such capacities, to
characterize and relate objects in various ways and in particular we take them to be
the cognitive capacities that underlie our rule-following abilities in the correct use of
predicate expressions. We assume in this regard that predicable concepts are those
features of thought and communication that determine the truth conditions of pred-
icate expressions, i.e. the truth conditions that predicates have in di¤erent possible
contexts of use. It is through the exercise of these capacities that our mental acts
(and in that regard our speech acts as well) are informed with a predicable nature.
Moreover, as cognitive capacities, which can be exercised by di¤erent people at the
same time, as well as by the same person at di¤erent times, predicable concepts have
an unsaturated nature (which is similar to, but not the same as Freges notion of
unsaturatedness). In this regard, predicable concepts are not objects, though the
exercise of such a concept in a mental or speech act results in an object namely, an
event.8
What a nominalized predicate denotes, accordingly, if it denotes anything at all,
cannot be the concept that the predicate stands for in its role as a predicate. That
it denotes anything at all is a posit that is made in conceptual realism for most (but
not all) concepts; and in particular the posit is that as an abstract singular term
a nominalized predicate denotes an intensional object specically, the intensional
content of the concept that the predicate stands for in its role as a predicate. Here,
by the intensional content of a concept we mean a hypostatization, reication, or
projection into the domain of objects of the truth conditions determined by the
di¤erent possible applications or exercises of that concept as a cognitive capacity.
It is by mean of such a projection, or conceptual nominalization, that we purport
to denote the intensional content of a concept which we also call the intension of
the concept as if it were an independently existing real Platonic form. Thus, not
only do we predicate of someone that he is cruel, or kind, wise, or stupid, or of a
balloon that it is round and red, but also through a conceptual nominalization of these
concepts, we purport to denote the properties of being cruel, or being kind, being wise,
or being stupid, of being round and being red i.e. the properties cruelty, kindness,
wisdom, stupidity, roundness and redness. It is through this process of conceptual
nominalization (as a product of linguistic and cultural evolution) that we hypostatize,
or reify, the intensional content of a concept as a real abstract object, and we do so by
8Although not all mental acts are speech acts, speech acts are mental acts expressed overtly in
terms of linguistic conventions.
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starting out from the concept as a cognitive capacity. The assumption that conceptual
nominalization (reication) leads to real abstract objects (as emergent products of
cultural evolution) is an ontological posit that goes beyond conceptualism proper,
and forms part of what we mean here by conceptual realism.
2. Referential Concepts, Simple and Complex
In addition to predicable concepts and their abstract intensional contents, there are
also referential concepts and their abstract intensional contents. In conceptualism,
as we understand it here, referential concepts are cognitive capacities that have a
structure complementary to predicable concepts the way that quantier phrases are
complementary to predicate expressions (or the way that noun phrases are comple-
mentary to verb phrases). When exercised jointly with a predicable concept in a
speech or mental act, a referential concept informs that act (an event) with a referen-
tial nature, just as the predicable concept informs that act with a predicable nature.
It is the exercise of a referential concept that accounts for the aboutness or directed-
ness to objects of a speech or mental act, and it is the exercise of a predicable concept
that accounts for what we predicate of such objects. An a¢ rmative assertion that is
analyzable in terms of a noun phrase and a verb phrase (regardless of the complexity
of either), for example, is semantically analyzable in terms of an overt application of
a referential concept with a predicable concept, with the assertion itself, an event,
being the mutual saturation of their complementary structures in that speech act.9
Referential concepts, on our analysis, are what quantier phrases stand for when
the latter are properly represented as containing a type of expression that we call
names, both proper and common, and both simple and complex. By a common name
we mean here a common count noun, including those (such as cat, dog, tree,
animal, etc.) whose use in thought and communication is associated with certain
identity criteria, as well as those (such as object, thing, or individual) that are
not associated with any specic identity criteria. Both kinds of common nouns stand
for common name concepts, but we call those that have identity criteria associated
with their use sortal concepts, because they involve classifying objects into di¤erent
sorts.10 Thus, where S is a sortal constant for the common name swan, and W is
a monadic predicate constant for white, an assertion of All swans are whitehas a
9In exercising a referential concept we purport to refer, and do not necessarily succeed in actually
referring to what we purport to refer which is why the aboutness or directedness of the act is said
to be a form of intentionality. What the conditions are for successful reference is an issue we do not
go into here.
10Mass nouns are common nouns that also stand for sortal concepts; but they are not count nouns.
Reference with respect to these kinds of sortals brings in problems about quantities of stu¤that
we cannot go into here. For convenience, we do not include them in our present account of general
reference.
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cognitive structure that corresponds to its grammatical analysis in terms of a noun
phrase and a verb phrase, i.e., its analysis as [All swans]NP [are white]V P. The logical
form of this cognitive structure is represented in our extended theory as (8xS)W (x),
or using -abstracts, as (8xS)[xW (x)](x), where the quantier phrase (8xS) stands
for the referential concept, and [xW (x)] the predicable concept, that are exercised
and mutually saturated in that speech act, thereby informing the act with a referential
and a predicable nature. The logical form of the cognitive structure of an assertion or
thought of Some swans are not white, with the negation understood internally as part
of the predicate, is represented as (9xS)[x:W (x)](x), where (9xS) and [x:W (x)]
represent the referential and predicable concepts, respectively, that inform that speech
act or mental act with a referential and predicable nature. A similar analysis applies
to other referential concepts, such as those based on the determiners most, few,
and numerical quantiers, as in most swans are white, few swans are white, three
swans are white, etc.
As referential expressions, the objectual quantier phrases (8x) and (9x) (or their
rewrite variants) that are already present in our theory of logical form are now con-
strued as abbreviated forms of (8xObject) and (9xObject), where the common name,
object, is rendered explicit as part of the quantier. For convenience, we will con-
tinue to use the familiar abbreviated forms, although occasionally we will also use
the fuller expression to emphasize some particular point of analysis. The logical con-
nection between our new logical forms, e.g., (8xS)F (x) and (9xS)F (x), and forms
in terms (8x) and (9x), is given by the following formulas, which we take as laws of
logic (having arbitrary formulas as substituends for F ):
(8xS)F (x)$ (8x)[(9yS)(x = y)! F (x)];
(9xS)F (x)$ (9x)[(9yS)(x = y) ^ F (x)]:
The right-hand side of each of these biconditionals is equivalent (by -conversion) to
a formula made up explicitly of the mutual saturation of a quantier phrase and a
predicate expression; that is, by -conversion, we also have the following bicondition-
als:
(8xS)F (x) $ (8x)[x((9yS)(x = y)! F (x))](x);
(9xS)F (x) $ (9x)[x((9yS)(x = y) ^ F (x))](x):
The point that should be noted here is that despite their logical equivalence (and
therefore their having the same truth conditions) the formulas on each side of these
biconditionals do not represent the same speech or mental acts. Thus, whereas a
speech or mental act whose cognitive structure is represented by a formula on the left
side is informed by a referential concept to all (or some) S, and predicates of them
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that they are F , a speech act corresponding to a formula on the right side is informed
by a referential concept to all (or some) objects and predicates of each that if it is
an S, then it is also F (or of some object that it is an S and that it is F ).11
We should note here that Geach allows only sortal quantiers and rejects unre-
stricted quantiers for objects simpliciter.12 He also rejects identity simpliciter and
allows only for identity relative to a sortal, or what we also call sortal identity. We
agree that at least in the initial stages of conceptual development (i.e. from child-
hood up to a mature grasp of our commonsense framework) identity criteria are rst
learned in terms of sortals, as when we learn to speak of the same dog, the same
tree, the same house, etc. If we were to explicitly represent such a stage of concep-
tual development, we would take identity relative to a sortal S as a primitive notion,
symbolized, e.g., as x =S y, which we read as x is the same S as y. Unrestricted
identity, i.e. identity simpliciter, would then be a concept developed later in terms
rst of sortal identity, where it would be understood as identity relative to some sortal
or other. That is, at a later, intermediate stage we implicitly understand identity as
follows:
(x = y) =df (9S)(x =S y):
Similarly, unrestricted quantiers for objects in general would, at least initially, be
formed in terms of sortal quantiers, which is how general reference is rst learned.
That is, reference to all objects, or to some objects, simpliciter would be implicitly
understood at an intermediate stage rst as a reference to all objects of any sort, or
to some objects of some sort:
(8x)' =df (8S)(8xS)'
(9x)' =df (9S)(9xS)':
Geach would reject the above analyses. In particular, according to him, Leibnizs
law is not valid for relative identity. Thus, for example, according to Geach, we can
have both x is the same S as y but not the same S 0 as y, i.e. (x =S y) and (x 6=S0 y),
where x, y are objects and S and S 0 are distinct sortals.13 This is not a view we accept
in conceptualism, where Leibnizs law is what distinguishes identity from equivalence
relations in general.14 We do not, in other words, accept Geachs injunctions in these
11A speech or mental act represented by the formulas on the right-side of these biconditionals
are L-equivalent (and in that sense correspond) to formulas that represent the cognitive structure
of the speech act or mental act indicated above; they do not themselves represent such a cognitive
structure because the sortal quantier occurring in the predicate expression is not represented as
having been deactivated. We explain the distinction between activated and deactivated referential
concepts and their related expressions in section 4 below.
12See [R&G], chapter 6. What we call a sortal concept Geach calls a substantival general term
(ibid., p. 64).
13See, e.g., Geach [1973].
14See Wiggins [1980], p. 21, and Stevenson [1972] for a defense of this position.
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matters.
We will not assume here that identity simpliciter and referential concepts to ob-
jects in general are dened as above in our present framework though, as we have
said, those analyses do mark an important stage in the development of these concepts
in our mature commonsense framework. Rather, we take identity as a primitive of
our theory, as well as the quantiers phrases based on the common name object, i.e.
the quantier phrases (8x) and (9x) (and their rewrites of the variable x). Quantier
phrases based on other common names (such as eventand artifact) that do not
have specic identity criteria associated with their use (as opposed to specic sorts
of events or artifacts) are also allowed (with the common names taken as primitive
constants), but we will assume that common name variables and quantiers binding
such range only over sortal concepts.
Complex common names in English are generated from more basic common names
by attaching a (dening) relative clause to the latter. We introduce for this purpose a
new primitive operator, =, and represent the operation of attaching a relative clause,
represented by a formula ', to a common name S by S=', which we then take to
be a complex common name, read as S (who, which) that is (are) '. For example,
Every number that is a multiple of 2 is evencontains the complex common name
number that is a multiple of 2and can be symbolized as (8xS=F (x))G(x), where
S is a sortal constant for number, F (x)is read x is a multiple of 2, and G(x)
is read is even. We account for the use of such complex common names and the
more usual way of representing relative clauses by assuming the following as meaning
postulates (conceptual truths) of our theory (where S is a schema letter for common
names and arbitrary formulas can be substituted for F ):
(8xS=')F (x)$ (8xS)['! F (x)]; (MP1)
(9xS=')F (x)$ (9xS)[' ^ F (x)]: (MP2)
Iterations of the =-operation can be reduced by means of these laws to simple con-
junctions as relative clauses; that is, by the above laws and other standard transfor-
mations,
(8xS='= )F (x)$ (8xS=' ^  )F (x);
(9xS='= )F (x)$ (9xS=' ^  )F (x);
are valid theorem schemas of our theory of general reference.
Finally, we note that the category of names is made up of proper, as well as
common, names, and that proper names, like sortal common names, also have identity
criteria associated with their use. These identity criteria are determined for the most
part by a common name sortal that corresponds to the proper name. We agree in this
regard with Geach who writes that for every proper name there is a corresponding
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use of a common noun preceded by the sameto express what requirements as to
identity the proper name conveys([R&G], p. 68). For Geach, such a common noun
expresses the nominal essenceor senseof the proper name (ibid.). The sense of a
proper name need not include the sense of any predicables, Geach observes, and, in
this regard he is quite adamant in rejecting Russells notorious disguised-description
theory of proper names(ibid.). These are points about proper names that we that
we agree with in our conceptualist theory of reference, except that on our account,
as we explain below, a proper name stands for a special type of sortal concept rather
than has a sense.15
Both proper and common names, Geach also points out, are di¤erent from predi-
cate expressions in that they can be used outside the context of a sentencein simple
acts of naming, which are not assertions, and, in that respect, do not amount to the
use of a name to refer.16 Our interest here is with reference, however, and not simple
acts of naming, and the referential use of a name, whether proper or common, always
occurs, at least implicitly, within the context of a sentence. It is in regard to the
logical form of the referential use of a proper name as part of an assertion that our
account di¤ers from Geachs. On Geachs account, only a proper name is a genuine
referring expression, or what he also calls a genuine logical subject(ibid., p. 86);
and, apparently, the representation of a proper name in logical syntax is to be none
other than as an individual constant just as Frege and most of the contemporary
views, including the so-called newtheory of direct reference, would have it.
On our account, proper names are no di¤erent from common names in the way
they are used to stand for referential concepts, and, in particular, in the way they
inform a speech or mental act with a referential nature. In fact, we take proper
names to be a type of sortal common names that necessarily satisfy a condition of
uniqueness. That is, a sortal name S is a proper name only if S can be used to
refer to at most one thing, or, in symbols, only if (8xS)(8yS)(x = y) is a conceptual
(necessary) truth. (If modal operators are added to our theory, we assume that proper
names are rigid, so that (8xS)(8yS)(x = y) is also a necessary truth.17
15The rejection of Russells disguised-description theory of ordinary proper names is an essential
part of the so-called newtheory of direct reference as well; but, unlike Geachs and our present
account, the latter rejects the idea that a proper name has a sense or stands for a sortal concept.
16 [R&G], p. 52. Nouns in the vocative case used in greetings, and again ejaculations like Wolf!
and Fire! illustrate this independent use of names, Geach observes, and we get a very similar
independent use of names when labels are stuck on things, e.g. poisonon a bottle or the name
labels sometimes worn at conferences(ibid.).
17Proper names of concrete objects, as opposed to names of abstract objects, are vacuous in any
world in which those objects do not (concretely) exist. The rigidity of these kinds of names is
that they refer to the same objects in any possible world in which those objects exist. Thus, where
E! is a predicate for the concept of concrete existence (as opposed to the concept of being, which
all values of the bound individual variables, abstract or concrete, fall under), these conditions for
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One noteworthy feature of our account is that it provides an appropriate represen-
tation of the two ways that a proper name might be used in a referential act; namely,
when the reference is made with an existential presupposition, as opposed to when it
is made without such a presupposition.18 An assertion, for example, of Pegasus does
not exist(where, by existence we mean concrete existence) would normally involve
a referential use of Pegasusthat is without existential presupposition, which we can
symbolize as (8xPegasus):E!(x). A referential use of Pegasusthat is with existen-
tial presupposition, such as might have been made by someone in ancient Greece to
assert that Pegasus can y, can be symbolized as (9xPegasus)F (x), where F stands
for the concept predicated. In both cases the speech or mental act in question is
informed with a referential nature, but only in the latter case can we say that the
referential nature of the act is with an existential presupposition.
A similar distinction applies to the referential use of denite descriptions, inciden-
tally, which we also represent as quantier phrases. We introduce for this purpose
two new quantier signs, 91 and 81, where 91 indicates the referential use of a denite
description that is with existential presupposition, as opposed to 81, which indicates
the referential use of a denite description that is without existential presupposition.
For example, an assertion of The man wearing a brown hat is bald, in which the
referential use of the complex noun phrase the man wearing a brown hat is with
existential presupposition can be symbolized as
(91xS=F (x))G(x);
where S is a sortal name for man, F (x) is read x is wearing a brown hat, and G(x)
is read x is bald. An assertion of this logical form has the same truth conditions that
Russell gave in his 1905 analysis; that is, we assume the following as a conceptual
truth of our theory of reference:
(91xS=F (x))G(x)$ (9xS)[(8yS)(F (y)$ y = x) ^G(x)];
or using -abstracts (and -conversion),
(91xS=F (x))G(x)$ (9xS)[x((8yS)(F (y)$ y = x) ^G(x))](x):
proper names can be summed up as follows:
PN(S) =df (8xS)((8yS)(x = y) ^[E!(x)! (9yS)(x = y)]):
Note that where x is an abstract object, then it is a conceptual (necessary) truth that x does not exist
in the concrete sense, i.e., :E!(x) is true, in which case the condition [E!(x)! (9yS)(x = y)] is
vacuously true of x.
18It is noteworthy that this is a distinction the so-called newtheory of direct reference is unable
to make.
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An assertion of The student who wrote the gra¢ ti on the blackboard will be pun-
ished, as made by a teacher to her class, where the referential use of the student
who wrote the gra¢ ti on the blackboardis without existential presupposition (be-
cause the teacher is not sure that just one student wrote the gra¢ ti, or that it was a
student, and not a colleague, who wrote it) can be symbolized as
(81xS=F (x))G(x);
where S is a sortal for student, F (x) is read x wrote gra¢ ti on the blackboard,
and G(x) is read as will be punished. The truth conditions for an assertion of this
form can be given as follows:
(81xS=F (x)G(x)$ (8xS)[(8yS)(F (y)$ x = y)! G(x)];
or in terms of -abstracts,
(81xS=F (x)G(x)$ (8xS)[x((8yS)(F (y)$ x = y)! G(x))](x):
Russell did not himself distinguish referentially using a denite description with-
out, as opposed to with, existential presupposition; and the analysis he gives makes
it clear that he was concerned only with a logical representation of the truth con-
ditions of such an assertion and not with a logically perspicuous representation of
its cognitive structure, including in particular the referential and predicable concepts
that underlie that structure. For example, regardless whether the referential concept
being applied in such an act is with or without existential presupposition, it is the
same predicable concept that is applied in either case. In the formulas corresponding
to the Russellian type of analyses it is not the same, but a di¤erent, predicable con-
cept that is applied in each case (as can be seen in the -abstract symbolizations).19
Also, whereas the assertion in question is the result of applying a complex referential
concept with a simple predicable concept (or what can be regarded as such for our
purposes), the speech or mental acts represented by the logical forms corresponding
to the Russellian type of analyses are the result of applying a simple referential con-
cept with a complex predicable concept. It is this distinction between logical forms
that represent the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts and logical forms
that represent the truth conditions of those acts that is important and fundamental in
conceptual realism; and it is a distinction that is not to be found in standard theories
of reference, including the so-called newtheory of direct reference.
19As noted in a previous footnote, the formulas on the right-hand side of these biconditionals
only correspond to, and do not themselves represent, a speech or mental act because the sortal
quantiers occurring in the predicate expressions of these formulas have not been deactivated(a
notion we explain in section 4).
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3. Geachs Negation and Complex Predicate Arguments
For Geach, as already noted, the only genuine form of reference is by means of
singular terms, and in particular by means of proper names. Thus, where f( )
represents a propositional context of English from which a proper name has been
extracted which is the sort of context Geach calls a predicable and f 0( )repre-
sents a predicable contradictory to f( ), then, according to Geach, when attached
to any proper name aas subject, they will give us contradictory predications; but
if Atakes the place of a[where Ais a sortal common name and Ais a quan-
tier phrase of English], the propositions f(A)and f 0(A)will in general not be
contradictories both may be true or both false([R&G], p.84). For example, Some
democrat will vote a straight ticket and Some democrat will not vote a straight
ticketcan both be true, whereas Bill will vote a straight ticketand Bill will not
vote a straight ticketcannot both be true where it assumed that both democrat
and Bill can be used to name someone in simple acts of naming. This shows,
Geach claims, that unlike the proper name Bill, the quantier (noun) phrase some
democratis only a quasi subject, not a genuine subject, and therefore cannot
really be used as a genuine referential expression.20 In other words, quantier
phrases, unlike proper names, cannot be used to stand for referential concepts (or, in
Geachs terms, cannot be genuine logical subjects) because they do not in general
yield contradictory propositions when applied to contradictory predicables.
Geach does not justify or explain why yielding contradictory propositions when
applied to contradictory predicables is a necessary condition for genuinereference
except, of course, for maintaining that this is what is true of proper names. That
referential expressions cannot be used as forms of genuine reference unless they
function the same way as proper names is simply assumed, in other words, which
begs the question at issue. Moreover, even when restricted to proper names, Geachs
criterion, or denition(rather than a real argument), for genuine reference i.e.
the claim that a genuinereferring expression will yield contradictory propositions
when applied to contradictory predicables is not unqualiedly true. For example,
using [x'] and [x:'] to represent contradictory predicables, and an individual
parameter (variable) a to represent the kind of symbol Geach takes a proper name to
be, the claim that [x'](a) and [x:'](a) are contradictories is not necessarily true.
In particular, whereas
:[x'](a)$ (8x)[x = a! :'];
and
[x:'](a)$ (9x)[x = a ^ :'];
20Geach speaks of referring phraseswhere we speak of referential expressions. He adopts this
terminology, which he takes to be a misnomer, only for the purpose of describing the theories of
general reference that he claims to refute (cf., e.g., [R&G], p.73).
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are valid in a logic free of existential presuppositions for singular terms, we do not
also have
(8x)[x = a! :']$ (9x)[x = a ^ :']
as valid as well. It is not unqualiedly true in such a logic, in other words, that a
will yield contradictory propositions when applied to contradictory predicables; i.e.,
0 :[x'](a)$ [x:'](a):
What does follow in such a logic is that any common-name sortal S, whether it is a
proper-name sortal or not, which can be used in simple acts of namingto name at
least one, and at most one, object will yield contradictory propositions when applied
to contradictory predicables; that is,
(9xS)(8yS)(x = y)! [:(9xS)'$ (9xS):'] ^ [:(8xS)'$ (8xS):']
is valid regardless whether or not S is a proper-name sortal or not.21 There is nothing
about this result that shows that the only genuinereferential expressions are those
of the form (9xS), where S is a sortal name for which the above antecedent condition
is true.
Geach gives a similar argument based on the observation that connectives that
join propositions may be used to join predicables to form complex predicate ex-
pressions ([R&G], p. 86). His claim which is really an assumption, and not an
observation in this case is that the very meaningconnectives have in the latter
use is that by attaching a complex predicable so formed to a logical subject [i.e. to a
genuinereferring expression] we get the same result as we should by rst attaching
the several predicables to that subject, and then using the connective to join the
propositions thus formed precisely as the respective predicables were joined by that
connective(ibid.). This claim (assumption) is true, at least as far as truth conditions
are concerned, when restricted to proper names: an assertion of George is home or
at the o¢ ce, for example, has the same truth conditions (but not the same cognitive
structure) as an assertion of George is home or George is at the o¢ ce. Indeed, where
a is an individual parameter (variable) representing the kind of symbol Geach takes
a proper name to be,
[x(' _  )](a)$ [x'](a) _ [x ](a)
is valid (and provable) in our logic.
The claim (assumption) is not in general true when applied to a universal quanti-
er phrase, on the other hand. For example, as Geach notes, Every politician either
21Geach, it should be noted, rejects the use of empty proper names ([R&G], p. 186), which
indicates how inappropriate his theory of reference really is for natural language.
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is cynical or deceives himselfis not equivalent to Either every politician is cynical
or every politician deceives himself; and in fact
(8xS)[x(' _  )](x)$ (8xS)[x'](x) _ (8xS)[x ](x)
is not a valid schema in our logic.22 This does not show that a universal quantier
phrase cannot be used as a genuinereferential expression that, e.g., in a speech
act in which Every politician either is cynical or deceives himselfis asserted, there
is no genuinereference to every politician as Geach maintains. Rather, it shows
that Geachs claim (assumption) is just not true in general. That is, it begs the
question at issue.23
Similarly, in the case of conjunctive compounds, why should we conclude that the
invalidity of
(9xS)[x'](x) ^ (9xS)[x ](x)! (9xS)[x(' ^  )](x)
shows that a quantier phrase of English that can be represented by (9xS), where
S is a sortal common name (complex or simple), cannot be used as a genuine
referential expression? The failure of synonymy does not show this except by
begging the question that only proper names can be genuinereferential expressions.
It is perhaps noteworthy, moreover, that the antecedent of the above conditional
i.e. the conjunction, (9xS)[x'](x) ^ (9x S)[x ](x) does not represent a basic
speech act that is analyzable in terms of a nominal (referring) expression and a verbal
(predicating) expression. Rather, it can at best be used to represent a speakers
22The equivalence does hold, on the other hand, if the common name sortal S can be used to
name at most one object in simple acts of naming; i.e.,
(8xS)(8yS)(x = y)! [(8xS)[x(' _  )](x)$ (8xS)[x'](x) _ (8xS)[x ](x)]
is valid (and provable) in our logic. Of course, we do have
` (9xS)[x(' _  )](x)$ (9xS)[x'](x) _ (9xS)[x ](x):
23It should perhaps be noted that whereas [Every politician]NP [either is cynical or deceives
himself]V P, with its noun and verb phrases marked, is a basic form of assertion in our theory,
having the logical form
(8xPolitician)[xCynical(x) _Deceives(x; x)](x);
which perspicuously represents it as the result of applying a simple referential concept with a complex
predicable concept, Either [every politician is cynical]S or [every politician deceives himself]S is
not the form of a basic assertion in our theory at all. This is another indication of what is wrong
with Geachs claim about the role of connectives in complex predicates.
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conjunction of two assertions in each of which the same referential concept is applied.
The important point to note here is that to apply the same referential concept in
two conjoined assertions is not the same as to purport to refer to the same object or
objects in those assertions unless the referential concept in question is based on the
use of a proper name. Geachs implicit (and false) assumption seems to be that if a
quantier phrase can be used as a genuinereferential expression, then it must refer
to the same object(s) whenever it is so used. But, e.g., in asserting conjunctively
that some democrats will vote a straight ticket and that some democrats will not,
one does not (purport to) refer to the same democrats in both assertions. It is by
begging the question and assuming that only proper names can be used as genuine
referential expressions that Geachs negation and complex predicate arguments have
any plausibility.
4. Active Versus Deactivated Referential Concepts
Geach does have a more interesting type of argument that does not beg the question,
but which in our conceptualist theory involves an important distinction between active
and deactivated referential concepts. In explaining this distinction, we note rst that
a basic thesis of our theory is that a referential concept is never part of what informs a
speech or mental act with a predicable nature, but functions only as what informs such
an act with a referential nature (i.e. as what accounts for that acts intentionality
or aboutness). Every basic assertion (as expressed by a noun phrase and a verb
phrase), in other words, is the result of applying just one referential concept and
one predicable concept. This means that a predicable concept that is represented in
natural language by a complex predicate expression in which a referential (quantier)
expression occurs is not applied in such a way as to presuppose an active exercise
of the referential concept that that referential expression stands for. Rather, the
presupposition is that the referential concept has been deactivated, which means
that the predicable concept is formed on the basis not of the referential concept but
of its intensional content instead. In other words, an applied predicable concept
that is represented in natural language by a complex predicate expression in which a
referential (quantier) expression occurs is not formed on the basis of the referential
concept that that referential expression stands for, but on the basis of the intensional
content of that referential concept.24
By the intensional content of a referential concept we mean here the intensional
24This interpretation of quantier phrases that occur as part of predicates (verb phrases) is a
conceptual counterpart to how direct-object expressions (such as the quantier phrase a unicorn)
of transitive verbs (such as seekand nd) are interpreted in Montague grammar where the direct-
object expression stands for the intension (or sense) of what it otherwise would stand for when it
occurs as the grammatical subject of a sentence. See The proper treatment of quantication in
ordinary Englishin Montague [1974].
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content of the predicable concept determined by, or corresponding to, that referential
concept. For example, where S is a proper or common name symbol (complex or
simple), and Q is a quantier symbol representing a determiner of natural language,
we understand the predicate expression and thereby the abstract singular term that
is its nominalized form that is determined by the quantier phrase (QxS) to be
dened as follows25:
[QxS] =df [F (QxS)F (x)]:
In other words, by the intensional content of a referential (quantier) expression
(QxS), we understand the abstract intensional object that is denoted by the nom-
inalized predicate [F (QxS)F (x)], which we abbreviate as [QxS]. In general, we
assume that any referential (quantier) expression that occurs within an abstract
singular term, i.e. within a nominalized complex predicate (i.e. a -abstract occur-
ring as a singular term), has been deactivated and cannot be used in that occurrence
to represent an active exercise of the referential concept that the expression otherwise
stands for.
Consider, for example, a context in which the sentence John seeks a unicorn
is asserted. The speaker, we maintain, purports to refer (with or without existen-
tial presupposition) only to John in this context, and does not purport to refer to
a unicorn. That is, despite the fact that the referential (quantier) phrase a uni-
corn occurs in the predicate or verb phrase making up the sentence used in this
assertion, there is no active exercise of the referential concept that this phrase stands
for; the referential concept, in other words, has been deactivated. This means that
the referential (quantier) expression a unicornis represented in logical syntax not
by the quantier expression (9yUnicorn), but by the nominalized predicate deter-
mined by, or corresponding to, that expression, i.e., by [F (9yUnicorn)F (y)], which
is [9yUnicorn] in abbreviated notation. Thus, the cognitive structure of an assertion
of John seeks a unicorn (where John is used with existential presupposition) is
represented in our theory by
(9xJohn)[xSeek(x; [9yUnicorn])](x);
where the quantier phrase a unicornhas been deactivated.
The same structural analysis, we maintain, applies to an assertion of John nds
a unicorn. That is, the referential concept that a unicorn stands for is no less
25The application of the -operator to predicate variables is understood as an abbreviated nota-
tion, which, in the monadic case, is indicated as follows:
[F'] =df [z(9F )(z = F ^ ')];
where z does not occur free in ':
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deactivated in this assertion than it is in John seeks a unicorn, which means that
the cognitive structure of this assertion is represented as
(9xJohn)[xFind(x; [9yUnicorn])](x):
There is a di¤erence between the two predicable concepts represented by Seek and
Find, in that the latter but not the former is extensional in its range (or second
domain) as well as in its (rst) domain. We represent this conceptual fact by the
following meaning postulate (where Q is a schematic quantier sign representing the
determiners of natural language and S is a variable having names, proper or common
and simple or complex as substituends):
[xFind(x; [QyS])] =df [x(QyS)Find(x; y)]:
It is by means of this meaning postulate that an assertion of the following argument,
John nds a unicorn; therefore, a unicorn is found by John,
which is symbolized as
(9xJohn)[xFind(x; [9yUnicorn])](x)
) (9yUnicorn)[yFind([9xJohn]; y)](y);
is seen to be valid. The related argument,
John seeks a unicorn; therefore, a unicorn is sought by John,
is not valid even though it has the same logical structure because, unlike ndthe
verb seekis not extensional in its range (or second domain) as well as in its (rst)
domain.26 The two arguments di¤er not in their form, in other words, but in the
kind of relational concept each is based on, and in particular on whether the concept
is extensional in its range (second domain) or not.
We should perhaps note here that Find is a relational concept, and not a real
relation in nature that can obtain only between concrete objects. That is why Find,
as a relational concept, can be used in the formation of a monadic concept such
as Find-a-unicorn, symbolized here as [xFind(x; [9yUnicorn])], which in turn is
neither a real property in nature nor a logically real complex property having
an abstract object namely, the intensional objected denoted by [9yUnicorn] as a
26We assume that transitive verbs are in general interpreted as being extensional in their (rst)
domains. Intensional verbs, such as seek, are not extensional in their range (or second domains).
The examples in this case are taken from Montagues The Proper Treatment of Quantication in
Ordinary English, reprinted in Montague [1974].
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constituent. Concepts, as we have said, are cognitive capacities, and a predicable con-
cept in particular is not only what informs a speech or mental act with a predicable
nature, but is also what underlies our rule-following ability in the use of a predi-
cate expression and as a rule-following ability, it determines the truth conditions
associated with the correct use of that expression.
The fact that a predicable concept such as those that [xFind(x; [9yUnicorn])]
and [xSeek(x; [9yUnicorn])] stand for has a complex representation does not mean
that it is a complex logical entity that has a realrelation and an abstract object as
constituents. Rather, what it means is that the truth conditions determined by that
concept are complex and involve the intensional content of a referential concept (which
itself is a projection into the domain of individuals of the truth conditions associated
with the use of that referential concept). If the predicable concept is based on an
extensional relation, such as Find, then, as noted in the meaning postulate for Find,
the involvement of the intensional content in those truth conditions is equivalent to a
strictly extensional account. The idea, accordingly, that the predicable concept Find
can have a class of ordered pairs as its extension with abstract objects as constituents
of some of those pairs is only a construction (albeit a mathematically useful one) of
abstract (set-theoretic) semantics, and does not mean that Find is a realrelation
which can obtain between concrete and abstract objects.27
This distinction is especially important in the use of the copula to express identity,
as when we say that Bill is a democrat. Here, strictly speaking, it is not the relational
concept of identity that is represented by is, but an extended version of that relation,
which, for convenience, we will symbolize as Is. The cognitive structure of an
assertion (with existential presupposition) of Bill is a democratis then represented
as
(9xBill)[xIs(x; [9yDemocrat])](x):
That is, because there is only one referential concept being exercised in an assertion
of Bill is a democrat, namely, that represented by (9xBill), the referential concept
that the quantier phrase a democratstands for is deactivated. Of course, this does
not mean that we are asserting that Bill is identical with the intensional content of
that referential concept. To get at the right truth conditions for this sort of assertion,
we assume the following as a meaning postulate (with S a variable having complex
or simple names, proper or common, as substituends),
[xIs(x; [9yS])] = [x(9yS)(x = y)];
27One might compare our conceptual view here with Montagues representation of the transitive
verb ndin his type-theoretical intensional logic, where such a logically real relation between
concrete and abstract objects is involved. Of course, Montague is concerned with representing only
the truth conditions of our assertions in a logical realist framework, and not also with representing
the cognitive structure of those assertions as speech or mental acts.
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from which the validity of
(9xBill)[xIs(x; [9yDemocrat])](x)$ (9xBill)(9yDemocrat)(x = y)
follows.28
5. Deactivation and Geachs Arguments
In one of his arguments against general reference, Geach claims that we cannot
suppose some manto refer to some man in one single way, because, if it were a
genuinereferring expression, then we should have to distinguish several types of
reference it is not easy to see how many.29 Suppose, he says, we can say some
manrefers to some man in a statement like this:
(1) Joan admires some man,
that is, a statement in regard to which the question which man?would be in order.
Let us call this type of reference type A. Then in a statement like the following one:
(2) Every girl admires some man
some manmust refer to some man in a di¤erent way, since the question Which
man? is plainly silly(ibid.). Calling this type of reference type B reference, Geach
goes on to argue that we must then distinguish further types as well.
The problem with this argument is that in an assertion of either (1) or (2), the
referential concept that the quantier phrase some manstands for has been deacti-
vated, i.e., the phrase is not being used to refer in either case. There is a di¤erence
between the two assertions, moreover, in that (1) logically implies that some man is
admired by Joan (assuming Joan is being used with existential presupposition in
this context), whereas (2) does not logically imply that some man is admired by every
girl. This can be easily seen to be so in the logical forms representing the cognitive
structures of these assertions,
(9xJoan)[xAdmire(x; [9yMan])](x) (10)
and
(8xGirl)[xAdmire(x; [9yMan])](x): (20)
28Russell, incidentally, proposed a similar analysis in [PoM], where he assumed that every propo-
sition consists of a relation between terms, and that, e.g., the proposition expressed by Socrates
is a manexpresses a relation between Socrates and the denoting concept a man. Presumably, the
relation was not strict identity, but something like what we are representing here by Is. Of course,
Russell was proposing a logical realist theory in [PoM], and not a conceptualist theory; and he had
nothing like our distinction between active and deactivated concepts.
29 [R&G], p. 32. Geach attributes this argument to Elizabeth Anscombe.
Reference in Conceptual Realism 20
Here we assume that admireis extensional in its range (second domain) as well as
in its (rst) domain.30 That is, we take
[xAdmire(x; [QyS])] = [x(QyS)Admire(x; y)]
to be a meaning postulate (at least in the context in question) representing a con-
ceptual truth. Then, from an instance of this postulate it can be seen that (by
-conversion and commutation of existential quantier phrases),
(9yMan)[yAdmire([9xJoan]; y)](y);
or equivalently, not considering it as the form of an assertion,
(9yMan)(9xJoan)Admire(x; y);
follows validly from (10) which indicates why the question Which man? is appro-
priate in a context in which (1) is asserted.31 What follows validly from (20) is
(8xGirl)(9yMan)Admire(x; y);
and not
(9yMan)(8xGirl)Admire(x; y);
which, in the form of an assertion, is equivalent to
(9yMan)[yAdmire(x; [8xGirl])](y):
This shows why the question Which man? is inappropriate in a context in which
(2) is asserted. It is simply false, on our account, to claim that there are two di¤erent
types of reference in assertions of (1) and (2). In both, as we have said, the referential
concept that the quantier phrase some manstands for has been deactivated, which
means that the phrase is not being used in these sentences to refer, no less to refer
in two di¤erent ways.
Another argument that Geach gives turns on misconstruing a reexive pronoun as
a pronoun of laziness,i.e. as a pronoun that functions as a proxy for its grammatical
antecedent and that can be replaced by that expression without changing the force
of the proposition ([R&G], p. 151). If every manhas reference to every man,
30It is clear that Geach assumes this to be so in the context in question. In some contexts, it
would seem, admiremight function as an intensional verb as, e.g., when we say of someone that
s/he admires Sherlock Holmes.
31In general, wh-questions apply only to active referential expressions, not to deactivated ones
or, as in this case, to those that could be activated as part of a statement that follows validly from
a given assertion.
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Geach writes, and if a reexive pronoun has the same reference as the subject of the
verb, how can Every man sees every manbe a di¤erent statement from Every man
sees himself? (ibid., p. 9). Clearly they are di¤erent statements, which, according
to Geach, shows that every mancannot be used to refer to every man rather than
that the reexive pronoun in this case is not functioning as a pronoun of laziness,
even if it has the same reference as the subject of the verb.
In our theory the occurrence of every man in the verb phrase of Every man
sees every manis not being used to refer to every man, but stands for a deactivated
referential concept. The same sort of observation applies, for comparison, to an
assertion of John sees John, where the occurrence of Johnafter the transitive verb
seesstands for a deactivated referential concept. The cognitive structures of these
two assertions (where it assumed that Johnis used with existential presupposition)
are perspicuously represented as follows:
(8xMan)[xSees(x; [8yMan])](x);
(9xJohn)[xSees(x; [9yJohn])](x);
where the occurrences of the referential expressions every manand Johnafter the
transitive verb are interpreted as standing for their respective intensional contents.
Note that unlike the above assertions, which involve the application of di¤erent
predicable concepts, assertions of Every man sees himselfand of John sees him-
selfinvolve an application of the same predicable concept, which is represented by
[xSees(x; x)]. The cognitive structures of these assertions are then represented as
follows:
(8xMan)[xSees(x; x)](x);
(9xJohn)[xSees(x; x)](x):
There is no doubt that the reexive pronoun himselfis not functioning as a pronoun
of laziness in these assertions even though it has the same reference as the subject
of the verb.
Now, if the relational concept of seeing, i.e. [xySee(x; y)], is extensional in its
range (or second as well as its rst domain), then, because Johnis a proper name
that is assumed to name exactly one object in the context in question, it follows that
John see Johnand John sees himselfare necessarily equivalent, i.e.,
(9xJohn)[xSees(x; [9yJohn])](x)$ (9xJohn)[xSees(x; x)](x)
is provable.32 That is, in the case of a proper name A (where A is assumed to name
exactly one object in the context in question), it is true that A sees Aand A sees
32If see is interpreted as an extensional transitive verb in a given context, then seeing in that
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her/himselfare necessarily equivalent, which is not to say that the cognitive struc-
ture of their respective assertions would then be same and in fact they would have
di¤erent cognitive structures as indicated by the above logical forms. On the other
hand, Every man sees every manand Every man sees himselfare not equivalent;
but, contrary to Geachs claim, this does not mean that the use of every manas
the grammatical subject of an assertion of either of these sentences does not refer
to every man even though its use as the direct object of the verb does not stand
for a referential concept. Once again, Geachs implicit assumption seems to be that
a referential expression is not a genuine referring expression, but only a quasi
subject, if it does not behave logically the way a (nonempty) proper name does.
6. Relative Pronouns and Referential Concepts
Some of Geachs arguments are directed not only against general referential expres-
sions of the form every Sand some S, but also against the view that there are
complex names of the form S that is F, and hence against complex referential ex-
pressions of the form every S that is Fand some S that is F, which, as already
noted, we symbolize in our theory as (8xS=F (x)) and (9xS=F (x)). One such ar-
gument Geach gives in this regard is based on the following medieval paralogism
([R&G], p. 143):
Only an animal can bray; ergo, Socrates is an animal, if he can bray.
But any animal, if he can bray, is a donkey.
Ergo, Socrates is a donkey.
Geach correctly observes that we clearly cannot take animal, if he can brayas a
complex term [i.e., as a complex name] that is a legitimate reading of Ain Socrates
is an A; any A is a donkey; ergo, Socrates is a donkey(ibid.); but he does not explain
the relevance of this observation, or how this shows that a complex name like animal
that can brayis not a genuine logical unit(ibid., 142).
One suspects that Geach has confused (or is trying to get his reader to confuse)
the complex name animal that can braywith an expression that is not a complex
name namely, animal, if he can bray. In other words, because an assertion of Every
animal that can bray is a donkeyis equivalent by the meaning postulate (MP1) of
section 2 for complex referential expressions to an assertion of Every animal, if he
context does not imply knowing who or what it is that one sees. For example, Johns seeing Mary
(in the extensional sense) does not imply that John knows that it is Mary he sees; and, similarly,
Johns seeing John (as in a mirror or a photo) does not imply that John knows that he sees himself.
In some contexts, seemight well be interpreted as an intensional verb, and in that case, John sees
Johnand John sees himselfwould not then be equivalent.
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can bray is a donkey, in symbols,
(8xAnimal=Can-Bray(x))[xIs(x; [9yDonkey])](x) $
(8xAnimal)[x(Can-Bray(x) ! Is(x; [9yDonkey]))](x);
Geach seems to confuse the grammatically correct claim that in the rst assertion we
are referring to every animal that can bray with the grammatically incorrect claim
that in the second assertion we are referring to every animal, if he can bray. Thus,
according to Geach, the phrase animal that can brayis a systematically ambiguous
one, so that we must devine from the context which connective is packed up along
with heinto the portmanteau word that(ibid.).
Geach recognizes that we cannot count this as provedand attempts to conrm
the suggestion of ambiguity by considering another sort of medieval example(ibid.).
This is the pair of sentences,
Any man who owns a donkey beats it. (3)
Some man who owns a donkey does not beat it. (4)
in which, on our account, man who owns a donkeyoccurs as a complex name. Geach
says that if man who owns a donkeyis a complex name, then it is replaceable by the
single word donkey-owner, in which case (3) and (4) would become unintelligible
(ibid., p. 144). Of course, this sort of replacement argument is fallacious in that
it deprives the relative pronoun itin (3) and (4) of an antecedent, as Geach himself
seems to acknowledge. He then suggests a supposedly plausible rewordingof (3)
and (4) in which itis given an antecedent, namely,
Any man who owns a donkey owns a donkey and beats it. (5)
Some man who owns a donkey owns a donkey and does not beat it. (6)
But (5) and (6) are not equivalent to (3) and (4), as Geach notes, because, in par-
ticular, unlike (3) and (4), (5) and (6) are not contradictories in that both would
be true if each donkey-owner had two donkeys and beat only one of them(ibid.).
Geach then rephrases (3) and (4) as
Any man, if he owns a donkey, beats it. (30)
and
Some man owns a donkey and he does not beat it. (40)
which, by the meaning postulates (MP1) and (MP2) for complex referential expres-
sions (given in section 2), are equivalent to (3) and (4). That is, as represented
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by appropriate instances of those meaning postulates, (3) and (30), and (4) and (40),
have the same truth conditions even though the cognitive structures of the speech or
mental acts they represent are not the same. Ignoring the distinction between logical
forms that represent the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts and logical
forms that represent the truth conditions of those acts, Geach fallaciously concludes
that the complex term A that is Pis a sort of logical mirage. The structure of a
proposition in which such a complex term appears to occur can be readily seen only
when we have replaced the grammatically relative pronoun by a connective followed
by a pronoun; when this is done, the apparent unity of the phrase disappears(ibid.,
p. 145).
One way to see that Geachs conclusion does not follow is to interpret the rela-
tive pronoun it in (3) and (4) as an anaphoric proxy for a complex (deactivated)
referential phrase, though not necessarily the same referential phrase in both.33 In
(3), for example, itcan be interpreted as an anaphoric proxy for every donkey that
he owns, which, by our rules, does result in a sentence that represents the truth
conditions of (3), namely,
(8xMan=Own(x; [9yDonkey]))[xBeat(x; [8yDonkey=Own(x; y)])](x): (3a)
Here it should be noted that although the (dening) relative clause who owns a
donkey in (3) contains the referential (quantier) phrase a donkey, no reference
is being made in this assertion to a donkey, but only to every man who owns a
donkey, which means that the referential concept that a donkeystands for has been
deactivated in the reference in question. That (3a) does represent the right truth
conditions can be seen in noting rst that by meaning postulate (MP1), (3a) can be
transformed into
(8xMan)[x(Own(x; [9yDonkey])! Beat(x; [8yDonkey=Own(x; y)])](x); (30a)
which, with itin (30) interpreted as the same anaphoric proxy as in (3), is the logical
form that represents the cognitive structure of (30). Now, because both ownand
beatare assumed to be extensional in their range, (30a) can be transformed into
(8xMan)[(9yDonkey)Own(x; y)! (8yDonkey)(Own(x; y)! Beat(x; y))];
which, by standard logical transformations, is equivalent to
(8xMan)(8yDonkey)[Own(x; y)! Beat(x; y)]:
This last formula does not represent the cognitive structure of an assertion of either (3)
or (30), but it does give a logically perspicuous representation of the truth conditions
of both, as Geach himself maintains.
33The proposal we describe here was originally made in Cocchiarella [1989], section 7.
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The relative pronoun it in (4) is an anaphoric proxy of a di¤erent referential
expression than what itis a proxy for in (3). Some man, as already noted, might
own two donkeys and beat only one of them, in which case reading it in (4) as
every donkey that he ownswill not do. This also shows why interpreting itin (4)
as an anaphoric proxy for the donkey that he ownswill not do as well. The correct
choice, as we show below, is to understand itin (4) as an anaphoric proxy for the
di¤erent referential expression, a donkey that he owns. Under this interpretation,
where the negation in the verb phrase does not beat itis internal to the predicate,
the cognitive structure of (4) is represented as follows:
(9xMan=Own(x; [9yDonkey]))[x[zw:Beat(z; w)](x; [9yDonkey=Own(x; y)])](x);
which we will call (4a). Now, given the extensionality of ownand beat(and there-
fore of does not beat), as well as the meaning postulate (MP2) for complex referential
expressions, (4a) can be transformed into the following equivalent formula,
(9xMan)[(9yDonkey)Own(x; y) ^ (9yDonkey)(Own(x; y) ^ :Beat(x; y))];
which, by standard transformations, is equivalent to
(9xMan)(9yDonkey)[Owns(x; y) ^ :Beat(x; y)]:
This last formula does not represent the cognitive structure of an assertion of (4),
but it does give a logically perspicuous representation of the truth conditions of such
an assertion, as Geach himself maintains. In this way it can also be seen that (3a)
and (4a) are contradictories, i.e., they both cannot be true and they both cannot be
false.
The sentences (3) and (4), accordingly, in no way support Geachs claim that the
complex term A that is Pis a sort of logical mirage, i.e. that it is not a genuine
logical unit, and that such expressions must be expanded into forms where there are
no complex names at all. Nor do they show that there are inextricable di¢ culties
with the conceptualist theory of reference we have described here.
7. Relative Pronouns as Referential Expressions
There is another more interesting, but also more problematic, way to show what
is wrong with Geachs argument against complex names, and therefore also against
complex referential expressions. On this proposal, relative pronouns are themselves
referential expressions, which in some cases, such as in assertions of (3) and (4), stand
for a deactivated referential concept, whereas in others they stand for an active refer-
ential concept that is relative to, and dependent upon, a preceding active referential
concept that is exercised in an antecedent assertion. On this proposal, what Geachs
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argument in the above examples really shows is the need for a special operator to rep-
resent relative pronouns as referential expressions in their own right, or what might
called pronominal referential expressions, rather than as proxies for nonpronominal
referential expressions.
The operator we adopt for this purpose is the symbolic counterpart of the relative
pronoun that(or, in plural contexts, those), which we will symbolize here as T ,
and which, like the quantiers 8 and 9, binds one variable and is attached to a name,
complex or simple, proper or common, as in (T xMan), which we read as that man
(or those menin plural contexts), or , (T yDonkey), which we read as that donkey.
On this proposal, the sentence (3) has the same assertive force as
If a man owns a donkey, then he beats that donkey.
or, if one prefers, the same as
If a man owns a donkey, then he beats it (i.e. that donkey).
with the phrase that donkeyexpressed, as it were, sotto voce. On this proposal, the
cognitive structure of (3) is not represented as (3a), accordingly, but as
(8xMan=Own(x; [9yDonkey]))[xBeat(x; [T yDonkey])](x): (3b)
The relative pronoun itin (3), in other words, is a proxy for the pronominal referen-
tial expression that donkey, which in this context stands for a deactivated referen-
tial concept relative to the deactivated antecedent referential concept that a donkey
stands for in the grammatical subject of (3). Now, by the meaning postulate (MP1)
for complex referential expressions, (3b) is equivalent to
(8xMan)[x(Own(x; [9yDonkey])! Beat(x; [T yDonkey]))](x); (30b)
which, on the present proposal, represents the cognitive structure of an assertion of
(30). Then, because ownand beatare extensional transitive verbs, it follows that
(3b) and (30b) are equivalent to
(8xMan)[(9yDonkey)Own(x; y)! (T yDonkey)Beat(x; y)];
which does not represent the cognitive structure of a speech or mental act, but does
represent the truth conditions of an assertion of either (3) or (30). For a logically more
perspicuous representation of those truth conditions, we need the following meaning
postulate for the T -operator to make clear that it is functioning as a pronoun relative
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to an antecedent referential expression34:
[(9yS)'! (T yS) ]$ [(8yS)('!  )]: (MP3)
Thus, by mean of this postulate and the preceding formula, it follows that
(8xMan)(8yDonkey)[Owns(x; y)! Beat(x; y)]
is equivalent to (3b) and (30b), and, as noted for our rst proposal (of the preceding
section), this formula clearly provides a logically perspicuous representation of their
truth conditions.
Turning now to a formal representation of the cognitive structure of (4), where
the negation in does not beat itis internal to the predicate, we have
(9xMan=Own(x; [9yDonkey]))[x[zw:Beat(z; w)](x; [T yDonkey])](x); (40b)
which, by the meaning postulate (MP2) and the extensionality of ownand beat
(and therefore of does not beat), is equivalent to
(9xMan)[(9yDonkey)Own(x; y) ^ (T yDonkey):Beat(x; y)]:
The relevant meaning postulate for the T -operator in this case is the following,
[(9yS)' ^ (T yS) ]$ [(9yS)(' ^  )]; (MP4)
which, together with the preceding formula, shows that (40b) is equivalent to, and
therefore has the same truth conditions as,
(9xMan)(9yDonkey)[Own(x; y) ^ :Beat(x; y)];
which, as already noted, is easily seen to be a contradictory of the above logically
perspicuous representation of the truth conditions for (3). That is, both this proposal
and the one of the preceding section yield logical analyses of (3) and (4) that have
the truth conditions Geach says they have notwithstanding the fact that complex
names and referential expressions are central to both.
34In order to avoid inconsistencies in the use of the T -operator, we must require that standard
logical transformations (including rewrite of bound variables) be restricted in their application in
some appropriate way until all occurrences of the T -operator have been eliminated in accordance
with the meaning postulates for that operator. It is the need for this sort of constraint that makes
this proposal problematic.
Note that (MP3) explains why sentences like If someone is married, then (s)he (i.e. that person)
has a spouseand If a witness lied, then (s)he (i.e. that witness) committed perjuryhave the truth
conditions that they do.
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Geach, it should be noted, rejects the idea that a relative pronoun can be taken as a
referential expression. When a relative pronoun is not a pronoun of laziness,Geach
claims, it is in general quite absurd to treat it as a singular referring expression,
and ask what it refers to([R&G], p. 152). It is, for example, absurd, Geach says,
to ask which man is meant or referred to by the pronoun hein an assertion of the
following sentence:
Just one man broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and he died a pauper. (7)
Now, it may in fact be that no one man, or perhaps more than one man, broke the
bank at Monte Carlo, in which case it would be false to say that hein (7) refers to
the man who broke the bank at Monte Carlo. But, on our conceptualist account, it
would not be false or absurd to say that someone who asserts (7) i.e., who asserts
each conjunct of (7) conjunctively purports, or intends, to refer to the man who
broke the bank at Monte Carlo in that use of he which is not to say that just one
man broke the bank at Monte Carlo and the person who asserts (7) intends to refer to
him. In other words, the denite description, the man who broke the bank at Monte
Carlo, as it occurs in the sentence Someone purports, or intends, to refer to the man
who broke the bank at Monte Carlostands for a deactivated referential concept on
our conceptualist account; and, because the predicate x purports (or intends) to refer
to yis an intensional verb, the deactivated referential concept it stands for cannot
validly be brought forward, as it were, and exercised as an active referential concept.
On the account we are proposing here, the cognitive structure of the two conjoined
assertions in (7) can be represented as follows,
(1xMan)[xBroke-Bank(x)](x) ^ (T xMan)Died-Pauper(x); (7b)
where broke the bank at Monte Carloand died a pauperare represented in an ab-
breviated form, and where the numerical quantier phrase just one man(or exactly
one man, or one man) is represented by (1xMan).35 Here, we are interpreting the
relative pronoun he in (7) as a proxy for that man, which stands for the active
referential concept of the second assertion conjoined in (7) but a referential concept
that is relative to the active referential concept of the rst assertion in (7), i.e. the
referential concept that just one manstands for.36
Now the meaning postulate for (1xS), where S is a name, complex or simple, is
(1xS)'$ (9yS)(8xS)('$ x = y);
35See Cocchiarella [1989], section 4, for an analysis of numerical quantier phrases, as well as of
how numerical predicates and numerals as singular terms are derived from such quantiers by
means of Freges double-correlation thesis.
36It is noteworthy that on the proposal of section 6 above, the relative pronoun hein (7) is an
anaphoric proxy for the man who broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and not for just the man. The
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where y is a variable other than x that does not occur free in '. By this postulate
and the second meaning postulate for the T -operator (given in the preceding section),
(7b) is easily seen to be equivalent to
(9yMan)[(8xMan)(Broke-Bank(x)$ x = y) ^Died-Pauper(y)];
which, as Geach agrees, gives a logically perspicuous representation of the truth
conditions of (7).
According to Geach, if hein (7) really is a referential expression, then it must
have a referencethat is somehow speciableregardless whether or not (7) is true,
so as to be the same whichever answer to the question is right ([R&G], p. 152).
That is, it is not a matter of whether one can purport, or intend, to refer in the use
of hein an assertion of (7) i.e. in an assertion of the second conjunct of (7) when
conjoined with an assertion of the rst conjunct of (7). Rather, in order for hein (7)
to be a genuinereferential expression so that it can be used to stand for the exercise
of a referential concept, it must, according to Geach, have a reference regardless
whether (7) is true or not. Here we are back to Geachs claim that a quantier
phrase cannot be a genuinereferential expression (the way that nonempty proper
names are) if it does not have a reference independently of whether or not the
sentences in which it occurs are true or false. Thus, e.g., the expression some man
in Some man broke the bank at Monte Carlocannot be a genuinereferring phrase,
according to Geach, because there can be no answer to the question Which man?
if a predication of this sort is false (ibid., p. 30). Against the idea that there is
a di¤erence between purporting, or intending, to refer in the exercise of a referential
analysis of (7) is then given as
(1xMan)[xBroke-Bank(x)](x) ^ (91xMan=Broke-Bank(x))Died-Pauper(x) (7a)
Nevertheless, it turns out that as with (3a) and (3b), and (4a) and (4b), (7a) and (7b) are provably
equivalent, and hence represent the same truth conditions.
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concept and the success conditions for actually referring in that act, Geach writes:
One might try saying that, when Some men are P
is false, some menis an expression intended to
refer to some men, but in fact fails to refer. But if
in the sentence represented by Some men are P
the subject-term is meant to refer to some men, but
fails to do so, then the sentence as a whole is
intended to convey a statement about some men,
but fails to do so and therefore does not convey a
false statement about some men, which contradicts
our hypothesis. ([R&G], p. 30, italics added.)
In other words, if in asserting that some men are P , one purports, or intends, to refer
to some men, but fails to do so (because no men are P ), then, according to Geach,
some men are such that one purports, or intends, to convey a statement about them.
This is clearly a mistaken view that fails to recognize the intensionality of purporting,
or intending, to refer, i.e. that confuses a deactivated referential concept with an
active exercise of that concept.
8. Concluding Remarks
We do not claim that the theory of relative pronouns as referential expressions pro-
posed in section 7 is unproblematic, it should be noted. If it should turn out that
it cannot be sustained, then we still have the theory proposed in section 6, where
relative pronouns are taken as anaphoric proxies for nonpronominal referential ex-
pressions. In other words, whether the proposal of section 7 is sustained or not, we
maintain that Geachs arguments against complex names and general reference do
not work against the kind of conceptualist theory we have presented here.
We also do not claim to have proved that our conceptualist theory of reference
resolves all problems about reference, but only that it has passed an initial test of
adequacy as far as Geachs arguments in [R&G] are concerned. It is our view that
a conceptualist theory is what is needed to account for reference and predication in
our speech and mental acts, and that only a theory of the referential and predicable
concepts that underlie the basic forms of such acts will su¢ ce. Such a theory, we
maintain, must provide a uniform account of general as well as singular reference, and,
in terms of the referential and predicable concepts involved in a speech or mental act,
it must distinguish the logical forms that represent the cognitive structure of that act
from the logical forms that only represent its truth conditions. That, in any case, is
the kind of conceptualist theory we have attempted to describe and defend here.
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